INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court held in Wright v. West I that a state prisoner's conviction based solely on unexplained possession of stolen goods did not violate his right to due process of law. The prisoner's petition for habeas corpus was based on insufficient evidence at trial. The Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit 2 and denied the petition. However, in five separate opinions, the Court failed to set a new standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact 3 in federal habeas corpus cases of state prisoners . 4 In his plurality opinion, Justice Thomas held that there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict the prisoner. 5 Justice Thomas relied on Jackson v. Virginia, 6 in which the Court held that a habeas corpus applicant is entitled to relief if it is found that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Thomas opinion initiated the debate over whether a federal court, when considering habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners, should give deference to state court determinations of mixed questions or continue to review mixed questions de novo. 7 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, denying the petition for habeas corpus, but objected to Justice Thomas's reliance on Teague as a method of narrowing the review standard since that case did not establish a new standard of review for mixed questions in federal habeas corpus cases of state prisoners. 13 Justice Souter agreed with the judgment of the Court. He denied review of the case either de novo or deferentially on the ground that the petitioner relied on the retroactive application of a new rule. 14 This Note begins with a brief review of habeas corpus and examines the standard of review of mixed questions, noting the constitutional law of insufficient evidence claims. Next, the five opinions of West are considered. Finally, this Note argues that West was an inappropriate case for the Court to attempt to overturn the standard of review for mixed questions in habeas corpus and that the underlying issues necessary to properly answer the standard of review question were not fully debated.
common law and was adopted in the American colonial common law prior to the Revolution.' 6 The United States Constitution protects against the suspension of habeas corpus,' 7 and the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts jurisdiction over those in federal custody seeking habeas corpus relief within the "principles and usages of law." 1 8 Thus, early Supreme Court decisions applied the traditional common law to form the writ's boundaries.' 9 This meant that a prisoner could not be granted habeas corpus relief when convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction. 20 In Exparte Watkins, the Court reasoned that the writ did not protect individuals from poor judgments but served only to guaranty a trial in a proper court. 2 ' During the post-Civil War Reconstruction, both legislative action and judicial decree expanded federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. In 1867, Congress strengthened federal court power in habeas corpus to include jurisdiction over state prisoners. 2 2 Additionally, the Court extended the boundaries of habeas corpus to include review of unconstitutional state laws.
2 3 In Ex parte Siebold, the Court Lat. (You have the body.) The name given to a variety of writs ... having for their object to bring a party before a court or judge. In common usage, and whenever these words are used alone, they are usually understood to mean the habeas corpus ad subjiciendum .... the purpose of which is to test the legality of the detention or imprisonment; not whether [ Although momentum for broadening the writ's scope was mounting by the end of the-nineteenth century, habeas corpus still only applied to convictions under unconstitutional laws. Thus, at the turn of the century, federal courts did not decide whether prisoners' rights had been violated by unfair convictions under constitutional laws. Furthermore, since habeas corpus differed from a direct appeal, federal courts only reviewed constitutional questions of law and deferred to the state courts' findings of fact. Thus, the Court confirmed that a federal court can review state court factual determinations. More specifically, Brown provided a flexible rule for federal districtjudges in choosing the appropriate standard of review for pure factual questions. 3 5 State court findings of fact deserved deference unless a "vital flaw" was found. 3 6 To find flaws, the district court must carefully examine the record. 3 7 If no record exists, if it is inadequate, or if a "vital flaw" appears on the record, the district court may re-hear the case to determine its factual merits. In Justice Frankfurter's separate but unanimously supported opinion, Brown also established the standard of review for mixed questions as follows:
[T]he District Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge .... Although there is no need for the federal judge, if he could, to shut his eyes to the State consideration of such issues, no binding right is to be attached to the State determination.
3 9
Thus, the Court ruled that a federal judge must make a de novo review of mixed questions, and in doing so, may review the state court court, alleging that his due process rights had been violated by an unfair jury selection. The North Carolina courts selected jurors using property tax lists which Brown alleged resulted in jury panels with disproportionately fewer African-Americans than whites. The Supreme Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, holding that no systematic discrimination had been shown. determination. 40 While a de novo review of the factual portion of the issue might not have been necessary, the judge was required to make a fresh and independent application of the federal law to the facts. 41 The Court reasoned that this expansion of habeas corpus was justified because "[t]he state court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right." 42 This de novo review procedure was quickly followed in the lower courts 43 and later clarified in Townsend v. Sain, 44 in which the Court again announced that the district court must make its own application of federal law to state factual findings. 45 In the past twenty years and beginning with Stone v. Powell, 4 6 in which the Court held that the use at trial of illegally obtained evidence did not afford habeas corpus protection, the Court has stopped the expansion of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 47 However, the Brown framework for the standard of review has remained fully intact. 48 As recently as 1985, the Court reiterated that a mixed question in a habeas corpus proceeding is subject to a de 40 Id. at 507 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 41 Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 42 Id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 43 InJackson, a convicted murderer contended that insufficient evidence existed at his trial to prove that he had the requisite specific intent to kill. 53 The Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief after a thorough review of the record. 54 The Court held that in a habeas corpus proceeding arising from a due process claim in which a state court has convicted a prisoner with insufficient evidence, a federal court must consider "whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 55 Thus, prisoners challenging state court convictions were entitled to relief only when the evidence at trial was such that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 56 proximately $3,500. 5 9 On January 10, 1979, sheriff's officers searched Frank West's home in Gloucester County, Virginia, and seized items they believed were stolen from Cardova's home. 60 Cardova later identified the items seized by police, estimating their value at $1,100.61 West pled not guilty to a charge of grand larceny pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-95.62 At trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses who testified about the timing of the theft, the ownership of the property, the value of the property and the chain of custody of the property after it was seized from West's home. West denied the theft and testified that he had purchased the items at flea markets, which he attended regularly. 64 West also testified that he remembered buying some of the items from an acquaintance, Ronnie Elkins, but his testimony surrounding Elkins was confused and incomplete. 65 Elkins did not testify at West's trial. 66 The prosecution presented no rebuttal evidence. 6 7 Virginia law permitted an inference that a person who fails to explain, or falsely explains, exclusive possession of recently stolen property is guilty of theft. 6 1 8 West was convicted and received a ten-year prison sen- 66 Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 3. West testified that he did not call Elkins as a witness since West was not aware until trial that he was being charged with stealing the property he bough from Elkins. He was incarcerated when the stolen property was seized by police from his house and the indictment did not specify the items that were taken from Cardova. Id.
67 Brief for Respondent, supra note 60, at 3. 68 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2485 (1992). The trial court instructed the jurors:
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that property of value of$ 100.00 or more was stolen from Angelo Cardova, and that it was recently thereafter found in the exclusive and personal possession of the defendant, and that such possession has been unexplained or falsely denied by the defendant, then such possession is sufficient to raise an inference that the defendant was the thief; and if such inference, taking into consideration the whole evidence, leads you to believe be-tence. 69 The Supreme Court of Virginia denied West's appeal, which raised several issues including whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On December 16, 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 80 In an unusual step, the Court amended the grant for certiorari two days later, stating:
In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are requested to brief and argue the following question: In determining whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, should a federal court give deference to the state court's application of law to the specific facts of the petitioner's case or should it review the state court's determination de novo ?81
This novel way of raising the issue suggested that some members of the Court were poised to abandon the de novo review standard of state court mixed question determinations.
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fourth Circuit decision and denied West's habeas corpus petition. 8 2 However, the Court's five separate opinions reveal its disagreement as to the proper means of arriving at the judgment. Since no majority opinion exists, the standard of review to be used by federal courts in determining mixed questions arising out of state petitions for habeas corpus was left unresolved.
A.
THE PLURALITY OPINION Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court. 83 The Court unanimously held that "there was more than enough evidence to support West's conviction." 84 Prior to announcing the judgment, however, Justice Thomas initiated a debate over what standard of review should be used in deciding mixed questions in habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners.
Justice Thomas first emphasized the writ's narrow applicability in the early years of the United States and its gradual expansion since that time. 8 a landmark decision, in which the principle of absolute deference was first rejected. 8 7 As Justice Thomas interpreted the case, however, Brown merely gave federal courts the ability to ignore state court findings of mixed questions; it did not completely thwart deferential treatment since a federal judge could still choose to rely on the state court's findings. 8 8 Therefore, according to Justice Thomas, the standard to be used after Brown was unresolved since deferential treatment, although no longer absolute, could still be invoked at the federal judge's discretion. 8 9 After reviewing the case law post-Brown through Miller v. Fenton, 90 Justice Thomas found that the Court never explicitly considered whether the standard of review should be de novo or deferential for mixed questions. 9 ' He opined that the Court, although never technically resolving the question, "gradually [came] to treat as settled the rule that mixed constitutional questions are 'subject to plenary federal review' on habeas." 9 2 Therefore, the use of plenary or de novo review for habeas corpus courts deciding mixed questions was merely fortuitous and lacked formal foundation.
According to Justice Thomas, Jackson v. Virginia 9 3 contributed to the fortuious use of a de novo standard of review. 9 4 Justice Thomas also argued that the Jackson Court confused the issue by first stating that state courts' judgments were entitled to deference but indicating later that the Jackson rule itself should be applied indepedently by the federal court. 95 Justice Thomas then attacked the practice of de novo review of mixed questions. He wrote, "Despite our apparent adherence to a standard of de novo habeas review with respect to mixed constitutional questions, we have implicitly questioned that standard, at least with respect to pure legal questions, in our recent retroactivity precedents." 9 6 Justice Thomas referred explicitly to Teague v. 
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Lane, 9 7 in which the Court held that a habeas corpus petitioner cannot rely on a "new rule" of criminal procedure announced after his conviction became final on direct appeal. 98 Justice Thomas argued that Teague and other recent retroactivity cases 99 stood for deferential treatment of pure legal questions and were premised on a new, more limited, view of the nature and function of the writ of habeas corpus. 0 0 Justice Thomas reasoned that habeas corpus was not designed to substitute for direct review and that its use should be balanced with the states' interest in finality.' 0 After preparing for an assault on the de novo review standard, Justice Thomas threw a white feather to his opponents and merely concluded that "such farreaching issues" need not be decided in West.' Although the Fourth Circuit suggested that it was using the Jackson standard to determine whether West's conviction was reasonable, it actually refined the test with the Cosby v. Jones 134 analysis.
13 5 Based on the five guideposts established in Cosby, the court of appeals reversed the conviction.' 3 6 Since Cosby was decided after West's conviction, it was a "new rule" pursuant to the Teague retroactivity test.' 3 7 Therefore, no court could apply Cosby to West's facts even though that rule afforded West habeas corpus relief. Justice Souter concluded that the Fourth Circuit's decision should be reversed in light of Teague.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court correctly decided West. West possessed recently stolen property and the jury did not believe his confused and incomplete explanation. Under Virginia law, a jury could find guilt based solely on the inference made from unexplained possession of stolen goods.' 3 8 The Court found that "there [was] sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 1 9 To afford West relief, the Fourth Circuit refined the Court's insufficient evidence test by using a new rule.' 40 Since a habeas petitioner cannot rely on the retroactive application of a new rule to gain relief,' 4 ' the Fourth Circuit erred.
More importantly, the Court in West exhibited division over which standard of review was proper. The Court opened the standard of review question even though it had not been raised by either party. This Note argues that West was an inappropriate case to de-cide the standard of review question, which resulted in an incomplete debate of the underlying issues. Thus, West merely represents the Court's irresolution on the mixed question debate and foreshadows the possible abandonment of the de novo standard.
A.
POOR FACTS/POOR LAW For two reasons, West was an inappropriate case to use as a basis for attempting to establish a new standard of review for mixed questions in habeas corpus cases. First, the facts in West were not favorable for discussing the differences between deferential and de novo standards of review. Since either standard of review produced the same result, the standard of review issue was irrelevent. Second, the test established in Jackson for insufficient evidence claims already gave deference to the state finding.
1 42 Thus, applying the test with a deferential standard of review was unnecessary.
The Facts
Justice Thomas concluded that "the claim advanced by the habeas petitioner must fail even assuming that the state court's rejection of it should be reconsidered de novo. ' " 14 3 Therefore, whatever standard was deemed appropriate for West's claim, he should not have been granted relief. The facts in West did not provide a basis to debate the important aspects of the proper standard of review since the different standards of review were not determinative. In essence, the standard of review was irrelevant.
A more appropriate case would be one in which a deferential review by a federal court would deny a prisoner relief but a de novo review would grant him freedom. For example, if the state court made a reasonable but flawed application of constitutional law to the facts, a genuine dilemma would arise as to which standard of review to use. Using a de novo standard of review, a federal court would correct the error. A federal court deferring to the state court would uphold the conviction.
Three of the Justices' opinions recognized that West was a poor case for determining the standard of review. Justice Thomas concluded that the far-reaching issues raised by the standard of review question did not need to be decided in West. 14 4 Justice Souter reversed on other grounds, noting that the standard of review ques-interests in both the finality of concluded litigation and the right to punish support any limitation of habeas corpus in federal courts. Assuming that a fundamental requirement of the criminal justice system is fairness, delays in implementing penalties on state prisoners frustrate this fairness and ultimately, justice. This argument is sometimes combined with the argument that the volume of habeas corpus cases reviewed by federal courts has put an unwarranted strain on the federal justice system, especially in capital cases.' 5 1 These interests must be weighed against what Justice O'Connor found to be the federal courts' obligation to determine constitutional law. Federal courts set the boundaries of constitutional protection by deciding cases requiring mixed question determinations. Moreover, many constitutional protections now recognized in federal habeas corpus courts only arise in the form of a mixed question. They include claims concerning insufficient evidence, 153 160 Although Justice O'Connor defended a federal duty to decide constitutional law, the Court in West ultimately did not balance the federal and state interests.
V. CONCLUSION
In West, the Supreme Court created a question which was not raised by either party. The Court asked the parties to brief the question of whether a federal court should give deference to the state court's application of law to the specific facts in habeas corpus petitions. In questioning the de novo standard of review precedent, Justice Thomas began a battle the Court did not finish. This indecisiveness in the Supreme Court serves as a warning of the possible abandonment of the de novo review standard.
